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I. INTRODUCTION

Society's relatively recent recognition of the critical importance of restoring and maintaining the quality of the environment has placed the regulation
of wetlands under close scrutiny. As the knowledge of wetlands continues to
grow, we realize that altering wetlands adversely affects the things that sustain life. Wetlands detain floodwaters, reducing their size and their destructiveness.' Wetlands absorb and filter pollutants that would otherwise degrade
groundwater or the water quality of rivers, lakes, and estuaries. Wetlands
provide direct spawning and rearing habitats and the food supply which
supports both freshwater and marine fisheries. 2 Wetlands provide the principal habitat for virtually all waterfowl. Wetlands also provide an important
habitat for a wide diversity of plants and animals, including a large portion
of federally listed threatened or endangered species.3 Some wetlands recharge aquifers that provide drinking water.4 Wetlands stabilize shorelines
and prevent erosion by binding stream banks and by absorbing wave energy.5 Wetlands also play an early and basic role in land formation, particularly in coastal areas that regularly lose land to the ocean. 6 Finally, wetlands
support the multi-billion dollar fishing, hunting, and outdoor recreation industries nationwide.7
Despite the important functions that wetlands serve, protecting them has
been difficult. Over fifty-five percent of the nation's original wetland acreage
has been lost,8 and substantial wetland acreage continues to be destroyed
each year. Estimates of lost wetlands vary from 300,000 to 500,000 acres
annually.9
Currently, the principal source of wetlands protection and regulation is a

1.

STATEWIDE WETLANDS STRATEGIES -

A GUIDE TO PROTECTING AND MANAGING THE RESOURCE

4 (1992).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.at 6.
7. Id.
8. Michael D. Blumm & D. Bernard Zaleha, Federal Wetlands Protection Under the Clean Water
Act: Regulatory Ambivalence, Intergovernmental Tension, and a Call for Reform, 60 U. COLO. L. REV.
695, 697 (1989) (citing U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, WETLANDS OF THE UNITED STATES: CURRENT
STATUS AND RECENT TRENDS (1984)).
9. Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 8, at 695.
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federal statute - section 404 of the Clean Water Act (the "CWA").' ° Inter
alia," section 404 of the CWA provides for "mitigation" of wetlands. 2
Mitigation compensates for the impact on wetlands by replacing or providing
substitute resources or environments. 3 Mitigation may include restoration,
enhancement, or creation of wetlands.
This paper evaluates the failure of created wetlands. 4 Part II summarizes the section 404 program and describes the problematic aspects of created
wetlands. Part III examines citizen suits in general and the citizen suit provision of the CWA in particular. Part IV considers the applicability of a private
enforcement mechanism to ameliorate the problems of creation of wetlands
mitigation. Finally, Part V concludes that there is no harm in developing a
provision enabling citizens to sue to enforce created wetlands permit conditions in an effort to decrease the nation's serious wetland losses.
II. SECTION 404

OF THE

CWA:

SEQUENCING,

CREATION, AND ENFORCEMENT

Section 404 regulates activities involving wetlands 5 by requiring a permit for discharges of dredged or fill material in "waters of the United
States."' 6 The permit issuing agency is the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(the "Corps") while the agency responsible for the oversight of the program
is the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (the "EPA"). Section 404 requires the EPA, "in conjunction with" the Corps, to promulgate "guidelines"
governing the permit program 7 and authorizes the EPA to prohibit or deny
permits.'
Certain activities which involve minor discharges are exempt from individual federal permits by section 404(f). In addition, section 404(r) exempts
federal construction projects specifically authorized by Congress 9 from sec10. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1982).
11. See infra notes 15-35 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 36-46 and accompanying text.
13. Roy R. Lewis III, Wetlands Restoration/Creation/Enhancement Terminology: Suggestions for
Standardization, in 2 WETLAND CREATION AND RESTORATION: THE STATUS OF THE SCIENCE 1-3 (ion A.

Kusler & Mary E. Kentula eds., 1989) (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.20 (1988)).
14. Important questions remain about whether created wetlands are a worthwhile endeavor at all, given
their uncertain ecological success. However, this paper focuses on a workable solution given the fact that
created wetlands are currently the most common form of mitigation.
15. Wetlands are "areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or groundwater at a frequency and
duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation
typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands include swamps, marshes, bogs, and similar areas." 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(t) (1992).
16. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1982). This paper does not attempt to tackle the issues and problems regarding the federal agencies' geographic jurisdiction over wetlands. See Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 8, at
713-19 for an overview of this issue. Much of the summary of § 404 is drawn from this source.
17. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(1) (1982).
18. Id. § 1344(c).
19. Id. § 1344(r). Few projects have been exempted, and none has been judicially challenged. Blumm
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tion 404 permit requirements. Section 404(e) authorizes the Corps to issue
"general permits" on a state, regional, or nationwide basis, exempting certain
categories of activities from individual permit requirements.'
A. Permit Procedures
Individual section 404 permits may be issued either in advance of a
discharge or after a discharge occurs.2 Permit applicants must submit their
proposals to the local Corps District Engineer,22 who notifies interested parties and the general public,23 decides whether to have a hearing, and analyzes the environmental effects of the proposal in an environmental assessment ("EA"). If the proposed action may have a significant effect on
the quality of the environment, an environmental impact statement ("EIS") is
prepared.26 Based on the analysis of the EA and/or the EIS, the Corps District Engineer then decides whether and under what conditions a permit
should be issued." In the event that the EPA, the Fish and Wildlife Service,
or the National Marine Fisheries Service objects to the proposal, additional
procedures are required.2" Despite all these procedures, a large percentage of
section 404 applicants receive permits.29
The Corps' decision whether to grant a permit is initially governed by
the public interest review. The Corps is to carefully weigh the "benefits
which may reasonably be expected to accrue" from a proposed discharge
against its "reasonably foreseeable detriments."3 If the proposed activities
fail the public interest review, the Corps may deny the permit. However, if

& Zaleha, supra note 8, at 723.
20. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(1) (1982). Only activities which are "similar in nature" and which have minimal individual or cumulative adverse effects may be authorized by general permits.
21. 33 C.F.R. §§ 325.8, 326.3(e) (1988). "After-the-fact" permits are widely used. Applicants apply
for "after the fact," retroactive permits to cure discharges that have been made illegally without a permit.
These permits present troublesome issues because they conflict with the concept of a regulatory program
based on assessing the impacts of activities before they take place. Blumm & Zaleha. supra note 8, at
729-30.
22. 33 C.F.R. § 325.1(b) (1989).
23. Id. § 325.3(d).
24. Id. §§ 325.2(a)(5), 327.4(a).
25. Id. §§ 230.7(e), 230.9, 230 app. a.
26. Id. §§ 230.6, 230 app. b.
27. Id. § 325.4.
28. Id. § 320.4(c). In deference to their expertise, the Corps guarantees "full consideration" to the
views of the federal and state fish and wildlife agencies. However, ultimately, the Corps need not agree
with their conclusions. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs (Westway 11), 772
F.2d 1043, 1054 (2d Cir. 1985) (only "serious consideration" warranted); River Rd. Alliance, Inc. v. Corps
of Eng'rs, 764 F.2d 445, 452 (7th Cir. 1985).
29. Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 8, at 729.
30. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(a) (1992): "All factors which may be relevant to the proposal must be considered including the cumulative effects thereof...." Id. The Corps has a presumption against filling of
wetlands on its public interest balancing, but its effect is unclear. Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 8, at 733.
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the proposal passes the public interest review, the applicant must still comply
with the section 404(b) guidelines.
The section 404(b) guidelines are the chief environmental criteria in the
section 404 program." The guidelines establish a presumption against discharges where there are practicable alternatives which have a less damaging
impact on the aquatic ecosystem, so long as the alternative does not have
other significant environmental consequences.32 "Practicable alternatives"
consider technical and logistical factors as well as cost to the applicant.33
Discharges into "special aquatic sites," such as wetlands, for nonwater dependent uses are presumed to have practicable alternatives. 4 Despite these
guidelines, considerable losses of wetlands have been sustained even though
practicable alternatives often exist. Applicants have circumvented the alternatives requirement by defining their project purposes so narrowly as to eliminate the availability of practicable alternatives. For its part, the Corps has
been extremely deferential to the applicants' stated purpose and alternatives.35
B. Mitigation
One of the reasons for the continued significant losses of wetlands is that
the regulations implementing section 404 proscribe all discharges unless
"appropriate and practicable" mitigation measures are taken.36 It is relatively
easy for applicants to circumvent the practicable alternatives test by defining
their proposed activities so as to eliminate the availability of practicable
alternatives. At the same time, applicants can propose mitigation to compensate for any impacts that their activities may have on wetlands."' Mitigation

31. Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 8, at 736; 40 C.F.R. § 230 (1988). The § 404(b) guidelines also
apply to general permits, permits issued under approved state § 404 programs, and federal projects exempted by § 404(r). Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 8, at 738.
32. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a) (1988).
33. Id. However, the lack of property ownership does not necessarily determine what is practicable. 40
C.F.R. 99 230.10(a)(1)-(2) (1988).
34. Id. § 230.10(a)(3).
35. See, e.g., National Audubon Soc'y v. Hartz Mountain Dev. Corp., 14 ENVTL. L. REP. 20,724
(D.N.J. 1983) (upholding a Corps permit allowing loss of 127 acres of wetlands for a commercial development finding it consistent with the practicable alternative guidelines). The Corps determined that the
basic purpose of the proposed activity was the development of raw land to profitably build a commercialindustrial complex. The Corps rejected the alternative of abandoning the plan because it did not achieve
the activity's basic purpose; the Corps also rejected reducing the project's scale because the purpose of the
activity was to build a large-scale development. The Corps found the applicant could not acquire and
develop another site because other sites would be less attractive to purchasers, and therefore, less profitable. Id.
36. 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(d) (1988).
37. In its 1978 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) guidelines, the Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ) broadly defined mitigation options for all federal activities affecting the environment as
follows:
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is intended to offset the biological and other functions that are lost when a
natural wetland is destroyed.38 The Corps' mitigation policy 39 states that
consideration of mitigation will occur throughout the permit process and that
mitigation includes avoiding, minimizing, rectifying, reducing, or compensating' for resource losses.4 The EPA's mitigation guidelines' generally
provide for a sequence of mitigation that begins with evaluating practicable
alternatives for avoiding adverse effects, and allows for compensation only as
a last resort.43
The EPA has expressed concern over the Corps' implementation of mitigation, specifically the Corps' failure to identify avoidance of adverse impacts on wetlands as a preferred option over compensation.' The extent to
which "sequencing"-avoiding wetlands, then minimizing impacts, then
compensating for impacts-is required is unclear.45 Although its ultimate
success is highly uncertain,' compensation, not surprisingly, is the most
common form of mitigation.47
C. Creation of Wetlands
The most common form of mitigation in Florida is the creation of
wetlands." Wetland creation projects are designed to create new wetlands to
offset the losses which are sustained when a wetland is destroyed. However,

* avoiding the impact altogether by not taking a certain action or parts of an action;
* minimizing impact by limiting the degree or magnitude of the action and its implementa-

tion;
* rectifying the impact by repairing, rehabilitating or restoring the impacted environment;
* reducing or eliminating the impact over time by preservation and maintenance operations
during the life of the action; and
* compensating for the impact by replacing or providing substitute resources or environments.
40 C.F.R. § 1508 (1988).
38. Ann Redmond, How Successful Is Mitigation?, 14 NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSLETER, FOCUS ISSUE:
WETLAND MITIGATION BANKING, Jan./Feb. 1992, at 1.
39. Stated in its regulations implementing the § 404 program. 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(r) (1988).
40. "Compensating" is used in this context as restoring, enhancing, or creating a wetland.
41. 51 Fed. Reg. 41227 (1986).
42. The specific requirement for mitigation under § 404(b) is in 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(d) (1988).
43. NATIONAL WETLANDS POLICY FORUM, ISSUES IN WETLANDS PROTECTION 176 (citing to 45 Fed.
Reg. 85, 336-85, 357 (1986)). The Henderson Wetlands Act of 1984 requires the Florida Department of
Environmental Regulation (DER) to consider mitigation proposed by the applicant in deciding whether to
issue a dredge and fill permit. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, REPORT ON THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF PERMITTED MITIGATION (1991) [hereinafter DER STUDY].
44. NATIONAL WETLANDS POLICY FORUM, supra note 43, at 179 (citing to a 1986 oversight hearing
of the Environmental Pollution Subcommittee of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee).
45. The CEQ definition of mitigation leaves the issue of sequencing open to interpretation. See supra
note 37.
46. See infra notes 52-58, 63-67 and accompanying text; see also supra note 37.
47. NATIONAL WETLANDS POLICY FORUM, supra note 43, at 181.
48. DER STUDY, supra note 43, at 1.
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the limited success of created wetlands is well-documented.49
1. The Florida DER Study on Created Wetlands
In 1990, the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation (the
"DER") began a study to assess the effectiveness of required mitigation
projects.5" The study focused on the success of wetland creation projects.
From 1985 through 1990, the DER issued 1,262 permits which included the
required creation, enhancement, or preservation of wetlands.5 The permits
authorized the loss of 3,305 acres of wetlands and required the creation of
3,345 acres, the enhancement of 7,301 acres, and the preservation of 7,588
acres. In addition to determining the acres of wetland permitted to be mitigated, the goals of the study were to evaluate the effectiveness of the permitted mitigation and to identify needs for improvement.
The DER examined 119 wetland creation sites required by 63 permits.
Each site was evaluated for compliance with the permit requirements and for
ecological success.52 The study found a surprisingly high rate of noncompliance. Only four of the 63 permits reviewed were in full compliance with the
permit mitigation requirements.53 Noncompliance ranged from minor nonsubmittal of required reports to major deviations from the permitted mitigation design. Furthermore, in about thirty-four percent of permits, the required
mitigation had not been done at all, although the wetlands had been destroyed.' At sites where the mitigation was actually accomplished, the ecological success rate of the permits reviewed was twenty-seven percent.55 In
some cases, it appeared that success rates could be improved by simple remedial measures such as nuisance species control and construction of connecting flow-ways.56
The DER study also found that in one of twelve cases, developers were
later allowed to fill in and build on wetlands created as mitigation for earlier
projects.57 The DER therefore recommended that perpetual easements pro-

49. See id; see also U.S. General Accounting Office, Wetlands: The Corps of Engineers' Administration of the Section 404 Program (1988) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]; David Crewz & Roy R. Lewis III,
AN EVALUATION OF HISTORICAL ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH EMERGENT VEGETATION IN MARINE
WETLANDS INFLORIDA (Florida Sea Grant Technical Paper TP-60 1991).
50. DER STUDY. supra note 43, at 1.
51. Id. executive summary.
52. "Ecological success was defined as whether the site is, or appears likely to become, a functional
wetland of the intended type of mitigation wetland." Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 2; see, e.g., Developer Offers Funds after Not Making Wetlands, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Aug.
12, 1992, at B3.
55. DER STUDY, supra note 43, at 2.
56. Id.at 7.
57. Id.at 18.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 6

tecting created wetlands become part of the permit."
In light of the low success rate of created wetlands, the DER recommended an emphasis on sequencing. The study found that the DER should
focus on avoiding wetlands destruction and on minimizing the effects of
permitted activities on wetlands.59 Creation is a last resort measure and
should only be accepted if the proposal provides reasonable assurances of
success.' In light of the high level of noncompliance, the DER also recommended that fines for noncompliance be assessed and that the applicant's
compliance record be considered as part of the initial decision to issue a
permit. 6' The DER also recommended that its staff be increased to improve
enforcement of permits.62
2. The GAO Report on the Section 404 Program
The 1988 General Accounting Office (the "GAO") Report on the section
404 program63 investigated the implementation of the permit program by
five Corps district offices."t The GAO Report noted the Corps' lack of enforcement. The GAO found that surveillance is not a high priority and that
the Corps seldom inspects permit sites. The GAO also found that the EPA
assumes only a limited enforcement role.65 The GAO found that the 404
program lacks any systematic monitoring and enforcement. The GAO Report
concluded that neither the EPA nor the Corps has implemented an effective
program to detect violations of permits."t The GAO recommended that if
the loss of wetlands is to be avoided, the EPA and the Corps need to establish a coordinated enforcement program that includes routine surveillance,
compliance inspections, and investigation and reporting of unauthorized
activities.67
3. Funding Agencies to Increase Enforcement?
The lack of adequate monitoring of permit conditions, particularly in
verifying the success of creation projects, is a serious problem.6" A more
effective enforcement program that includes monitoring long-term compliance would not only decrease the nation's wetlands losses, but could provide

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. executive summary.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
GAO REPORT, supra note 49.
Id.at 1.
Id. at 55-56.
Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 8. at 748.
GAO REPORT, supra note 49, at 73-74.
NATIONAL WETLANDS POLICY FORUM, supra note 43, at 187.
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valuable information that might give us scientific understanding of the viability of created wetlands.' However, such a program could be very expensive. Close monitoring requires staff and technical support. Also, results from
enforcement programs and creation projects may not be realized immediately;
therefore, a long-term management structure would need to be in place. At a
time when both state and federal governments are facing serious budgetary
constraints, to suggest that the enforcement agencies should simply be given
increased funding would be naive.
Empowering citizens to enforce compliance with required mitigation may
be a viable solution. Part III briefly examines the citizen suit provision that
already exists in the CWA ° and identifies some of the issues that need to
be tackled before a citizen suit provision could be used to enforce compliance of required mitigation.
III. CITIZEN SUITS AND THE

CWA

r7'
A. Citizen Suits in General

In the early 1980's, private environmental organizations mounted a largescale litigation campaign to enforce several major regulatory statutes against
polluters.72 The statutes which enabled them to enforce these environmental
regulations, commonly described as "citizen suit" provisions, had been written into law in the 1970s, but had remained relatively unused until the early
1980s. 73 By 1985, more than 350 citizen suits had been initiated.74
Deterrence is the primary purpose of citizen suits. 75 Government agencies are often unable or unwilling to enforce regulatory laws as they should
be enforced because of bureaucratic, political, financial, or logistical constraints.76 Citizen suits politically spur the government's own enforcement
and actually perform the enforcement role when the government lacks the

69. Id.
70. This paper focuses on the citizen suit provision of the CWA because the CWA regulates activities
on wetlands. However, citizen suit provisions are present in at least 12 other environmental laws: the
Clean Air Act, the FWPCA, the MPRSA, the Noise Control Act, the Endangered Species Act, the DPA,
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act, CERCLA, the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, and the
OCSLA. Barry Breen, Citizen Suits for Natural Resource Damages: Closing a Gap, 24 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 851, 871 (1989).
71. For a comprehensive treatment of citizen suit provisions, see Jeffery G. Miller, CITIZEN SUITS:
PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS (Envtl. L. Inst. 1987) (Portland, Or.).
72. Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of
Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 833, 835 (1985).
73. Id.
74. For a historical perspective of citizen suits, see Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 72, at 946-57.
75. Id. at 836.
76. Id. at 836-37.
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resources to enforce on its own.77
There are two basic kinds of citizen suits in environmental law: (1) suits
by private citizens against other private citizens alleged to be in violation of
a federal environmental law and (2) suits by private citizens against the executive branch of the federal government, usually the EPA, alleging the government has not carried out a mandatory duty in implementing an environmental law.7" Citizens are essentially acting as "private attorneys general"
because they are vindicating public rights.79
B. The Citizen Suit Provision of the CWA
The citizen suit provision of the CWA authorizes any citizen to commence a civil action against a private or public facility that is polluting waterways in violation of the limits imposed under the statute. A citizen may
also commence an action against the EPA for its failure to perform any duties mandated under the CWA.' The statute provides three types of remedies for citizen suit enforcement actions." The court has the power to enforce the legal requirement that has been violated, to require the defendant to
pay civil penalties, 2 and to award the plaintiffs attorney fees and litigation
costs. 3
Citizen suits have centered on the CWA. Concerned with a perceived
gap in federal and state agencies enforcement, several well-known environmental groups such as the Sierra Club, Natural Resources Defense Council,
and Friends of the Earth have led a national citizen suit effort under the
CWA."5 By 1988, 882 citizen suits had been filed under the CWA."6 One

77.
78.
79.
80.

Breen, supra note 70, at 874.
Id. at 870.
Id.
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982): Any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf-

(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other governmental
instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this
Act or (B) an order issued by the Administrator of a State with respect to such a standard
or limitation, or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to
perform any act or duty under this Chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator.
Id.
81. Marcia R. Gelpe & Janis L. Barnes. Penalties in Settlements of Citizen Suit Enforcement Actions
under the Clean Water Act, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1025, 1027 (1990).
82. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988).
83. Id. § 1365(d).
84. See Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 72, at 917: Comment. Polluter-Financed Environmentally
Beneficial Expenditures: Effective Use or Improper Abuse of Citizen Suits Under the Clean Water Act?,
21 ENVTL. L. 175, 182 (1991).
85. Theodore L. Garrett, U.S. Supreme Court's Ruling in Gwaltney Case Marks Watershed in Citizen
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of the main reasons for the citizen suits' centering on the CWA is the system
of monitoring, self-reporting, and data processing developed under that statute." All dischargers are required to file regular reports of their discharges."8 These reports are available to the public 9 and provide adequate
proof of a violation.' Citizen suits under the CWA have prodded the EPA
and state agencies to emphasize and enforce compliance with the statute. 91
C. Constraints on Citizen Suits
There are some constraints on citizen suits. Private parties may only sue
to enforce the precise limits established by the appropriate agencies. 92 Furthermore, suits against the EPA are only allowed when the EPA has failed to
perform a nondiscretionary duty.93 Finally, the party bringing the suit must
give the EPA, the state where the violation allegedly occurred, and the alleged violator sixty days' notice before filing the complaint. The EPA may
then elect to take control of the controversy and thereby bar the citizen
suit.'
The Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay
Foundation, Inc.,9' where the Court ruled that citizens could not bring suits
based wholly on past violations,96 is unlikely to affect section 404 citizen
enforcement. 97 Illegal discharges of dredged or fill material remain statutory
violations until they are permitted; therefore they are not past, but present,
violations of the statute.98 In addition, a provision empowering citizens to
sue persons who are violating mitigation requirements would likely be unaffected by Gwaltney. Serious violators of mitigation requirements are unlikely
to be able to create a wetland in the sixty-day interim period between the

Enforcement of Environmental Laws, in ENV'T REP. (BNA), Jan. 15, 1988.
86. Gelpe & Barnes, supra note 81, at 1026.
87. Id.
88. 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a) (1988).
89. Id. § 1318(b).
90. Gelpe & Barnes, supra note 81, at 1026.
91. Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 72, at 957.
92. Id. at 846.
93. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (1988).
94. Id. § 1365(b)(1)(A)-(B). In Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989), the Supreme
Court held that where a party suing under RCRA's citizen suit provision had failed to meet the 60-day
notice requirement, suit had to be dismissed. Although the Court did not need to determine whether notice
was a jurisdictional requirement in the strict sense of the term, the Court held that notice was a mandatory
condition precedent for suit. Id.
95. 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
96. Id. at 64.
97. For a comprehensive analysis of Gwaltney's effect on citizen suits under the CWA, see Beverly
McQueary Smith, The Viability of Citizens' Suits Under CWA After Gwaltney Smithfield v. Chesapeake
Bay Foundation, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1 (1990).
98. Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 8, at 753.
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time they are notified of the impending suit and the time the suit is commenced. Any mitigation requirement violation would therefore likely be a
present, not a past, violation."
However, a recent Supreme Court decision that narrowed standing will
probably constrain citizen suits. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife"m involved a
challenge to a rule promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior interpreting
section 7 of the Endangered Species Act (the "ESA") making the ESA inapplicable to U. S. governmental actions taken in foreign nations.' The rule
was challenged by Defenders of Wildlife as a violation of the ESA.3 The
environmental group asserted standing based primarily on affidavits from two
of its members who had studied and observed various endangered species
overseas.0 3 Plaintiffs alleged that U. S. government-funded activities would
destroy these species and that destruction of these species would injure them
because they intended to return overseas to observe the species."
Speaking through Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court found that the attenuated injury to two individual members of the national organization was not
sufficient to confer standing to sue."t5 Justice Scalia summarily rejected the
plaintiffs' "ecosystem nexus," "animal nexus," and "vocational nexus" standing theories." Plaintiffs further asserted they had standing under the ESA's
citizen suit provision, which provides that "any person may commence a
civil suit on his own behalf' to enjoin violations of the ESA. ° However,
Justice Scalia archly rejected this assertion, reasoning that Congress has no
authority to compel courts to entertain claims by citizens who did not independently satisfy Article III's standing requirements.'
Justice Scalia then
went on to question the constitutionality of citizen suit provisions in general
and expounded his theory that the duty to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed" is inherently an executive function that should not be usurped
by courts and private litigants; that the courts should address individual
harms and that the "majoritarian" harms should be addressed by the political

99. Some minor violations such as nonsubmittal of required reports could be corrected in the interim
period. However, the most egregious violations, which the DER study found are surprisingly common, are
not likely to be corrected. See supra text accompanying notes 53-56.
100. 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
101. Id. at 2135.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2137-38.
104. Id. at 2138.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 2139-40. Under the "ecosystem nexus" theory, plaintiffs asserted standing based on their use
of a part of a contiguous ecosystem which would be adversely affected by the funded activity. Under the
"animal nexus" theory, plaintiffs asserted standing based on their interest in studying or seeing the endangered animals. Under the "vocational nexus" theory, plaintiffs asserted standing based on their professional interest in the endangered animals. Id.
107. Id. at 2142.
108. Id. at 2144-45.
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branches."°
Given Scalia's hostility toward novel standing theories in particular"
and to citizen suit standing in general, typical plaintiffs who take advantage
of citizen suit provisions should anticipate problems establishing standing.
Absent a specific factual showing of injury, plaintiffs would need to rely on
an explicit statement by Congress establishing their right to sue. However,
Lujan made clear that Congress cannot simply confer standing to sue on
citizens who do not independently meet the constitutional standing requirements embodied in Article III. Congress therefore would need to explicitly
define new injuries that are sufficient to confer standing to sue."'
Given the recent history of citizen suits and the issues these provisions
give rise to, the question becomes whether a citizen suit provision enabling
private parties to enforce required mitigation would be both desirable and
feasible. Part IV examines this question.
IV. CITIZEN SUITS: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT AND MONITORING OF
REQUIRED MITIGATION

Citizen suits under the CWA have spurred government agencies to enforce provisions and have been enforcement tools themselves when government agencies have been unable to enforce provisions on their own." 2 At
the same time, creation of wetlands mitigation has enjoyed very limited
success mainly because of the permittees' high rate of noncompliance and
the responsible agencies' lack of enforcement and monitoring. "' Enacting a
provision empowering private citizens to commence an action against an
agency which has failed to enforce mitigation requirements as well as against
a person who is not complying with required mitigation seems like a logical
step towards ameliorating the success rate of created wetlands.
A. Citizen Suits: A Modest Solution
A citizen suit provision would not be the panacea to the problems of
created wetlands. The limited success of created wetlands is attributable to a
combination of failures including misguided policies, lack of scientific
knowledge, and lack of enforcement and monitoring. Citizen suits would

109. Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 72, at 946; see also Robert Gordon, The U.S. Supreme Court Year
in Review, 1991-1992, NEW JERSEY L.J., Aug. 24, 1992, at 9.
110. "Standing is not 'an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable'...." 112 S. Ct. at 2139
(citing United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 688
(1973)).
Ill. See infra text accompanying notes 129-30 for proposed new injuries that Congress could explicitly
define.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 76-77, 85-91.
113. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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only directly address the enforcement and monitoring problems.
1. Misguided Policies
Requiring applicants to sequence - avoiding wetlands destruction and
minimizing the effects of permitted activities before considering compensation - would likely decrease the number of permits allowing wetlands destruction. Only after all attempts to avoid and minimize fail should mitigation
be considered. In that instance, enhancement, preservation, and creation, in
that order, should be considered." 4 However, even if sequencing were a
clearly nondiscretionary step that the permitting agency was required to take
in the initial decisionmaking process, lax enforcement of this duty could be a
problem. The legislative history of the CWA reflects considerable skepticism,
if not despair, over the prospect of effective government enforcement." 5
Simply restating the policies that are to be followed may not be sufficient
because it would be placing the burden on the same agencies that have had
serious problems enforcing the existing regulations.
Furthermore, although avoiding and minimizing are the preferred courses
of action, compensating, in the form of created wetlands, remains the primary form of mitigation." 6 Although less than ideal, creation of wetlands is
the alternative that most applicants opt for. Until a more viable solution is
proposed, we should ensure that created wetlands are as ecologically successful as they can be.
2. Lack of Scientific Knowledge
The ecological success of created wetlands is limited by current scientific
and technological knowledge. At present, wetland creation remains an unproven technology and at best can replace only certain wetland functions
(e.g., flood storage), but not others (e.g., groundwater recharge and wildlife
habitat).' 17 However, given the fact that wetland creation remains the
most common form of mitigation, falling back on the argument that there is
simply not enough we know about created wetlands to make them work is
unacceptable. Rather, we must work on expanding our scientific and technological knowledge about created wetlands.
Furthermore, our current lack of scientific knowledge of created wetlands
stems primarily from a past failure to monitor created wetlands. The Florida
DER study proposed several recommendations to improve the success rate of
creation projects based on the close monitoring of existing created

114.
115.
116.
117.

DER STUDY, supra note 43, executive summary.
Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 72, at 846.
NATIONAL WETLANDS POLICY FORUM. supra note 43, at 181; DER
Blumm & Zaleha, supra note 8, at 763.

STUDY,

supra note 43, at 1.
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wetlands." 8 Stricter enforcement and close, long-term monitoring is likely
to expand our knowledge about created wetlands and thereby make their
future ecological success more feasible.
3. Lack of Enforcement and Monitoring
A citizen suit provision empowering private citizens to commence an
action against an agency that has failed to enforce mitigation requirements,
as well as against a person who is in noncompliance with mitigation requirements, would certainly address the lack of enforcement and monitoring problems. A citizen suit provision to enforce monitoring coupled with an
attorneys' fee recovery provision would give environmental groups that have
made use of other citizen suit provisions an opportunity to help make created
wetlands work. Groups such as the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, and
Natural Resources Defense Council would likely commence suit against
violators of required mitigation and against the EPA for lack of enforcement.
The media could be used to inform the general public about the new program
and about how to become involved.
In the event that the citizen suit provision does not work effectively,
namely, if too few actual suits are filed, the risk to the environment is
low. 9 Government enforcement through the existing approach would continue to work, or not work, just as it does today. 2 This is a modest proposal; if it does not work, nothing would be lost.
However, the proposed provision to enforce mitigation is likely to be
effective. Like water violations, violations of required mitigation are geographically fixed, and the areas affected can be fairly readily identified by
would-be plaintiffs. Cases where citizen suits are available, but have not been
very effective, include instances where the violation of the statute is neither a
concrete nor an easily observable occurrence. A case in point is the citizen
suit provision in the Clean Air Act (CAA). 2 ' Emissions of toxic substances
into the air are not obvious. Furthermore, the source of the emission may be
hard to trace. Consequently, private citizens are less prone to be motivated
by a violation they cannot see. Even if citizens are motivated to sue the
violator in an effort to deter would-be violators, they are more likely to be
discouraged by the difficulty of proving that this non-concrete violation
caused some adverse impact on their interests.

118. For example, the study found that freshwater creation sites were less successful than tidal wetlands
sites. The DER therefore recommended that freshwater wetland creation should be authorized only when
the applicant has substantiated the future range of the water table elevation at the creation site. DER
STUDY, supra note 43, at 24.
119. Breen, supra note 70, at 853-54 (discussing the effectiveness of citizen suits in general).
120. Id.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1982).

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 6

On the other hand, filling and dredging a wetland and failing to recreate
one are concrete occurrences that can be observed with the naked eye. Therefore, private citizens who observe the destruction of a wetland and the failure
to recreate one may be offended at both the violator and at the agency which
leaves the violation undisturbed. It is this kind of indignation that likely
spurs citizen suits. Concrete violations are not only more likely to motivate
private citizens than abstract violations would, but also make proof of adverse impact on private interests easier because harm is more easily traceable
to a concrete violation than to an abstract one.
It should also be noted that expanding citizen enforcement rights in the
CWA adds virtually nothing to the federal budget deficit. This is a key consideration because it makes the concept more "enactable" in Congress and
makes it more sustainable in the long term because it is not subject to budget
cuts.'
In today's economy, government programs that stand the best
chance of surviving and succeeding
are those that are self-executing without
123
the need of federal funds.
B. Drafting the Citizen Suit Provision
1. Procedural Device
The proposed provision would be most appropriately enacted in the
CWA because this statute already protects wetlands and has been the focus
of most citizen suits because of its self-monitoring and self-reporting requirements. The infrastructure of the substantive doctrine of mitigation is already
in place; the citizen suit provision would merely be a procedural device to
help enforce substantive law.' 24 The proposed provision would only be an
addition; it would not replace anything. Therefore, there would be no need to
repeal any existing law.
2. Coordination Needs
There would be a need to coordinate public and private enforcement so
both the responsible agencies and private citizens can work towards a common purpose. 2 ' Private enforcement should not interfere with the enforcement efforts of the responsible agencies. Also, like cases should be treated
alike. If there is a widespread perception of inequity, voluntary compliance
could be undermined. Furthermore, inconsistency in enforcement invites
litigation, which in turn causes delay and increases costs.2 6
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Breen, supra note 70, at 875.
Id. at 877.
Id. at 877 (discussing the procedural nature of citizen suit provisions in general).
Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 72, at 839.
Id. at 895-96.
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Incorporating a sixty-day notice requirement in the proposed provision
similar to the one in the CWA'27 would address this coordination concern.
The proposed citizen suit provision should require the plaintiff to give notice
to the EPA, the state where the violation occurred, and the alleged violator
before filing suit. This interim period would permit government enforcers to
take control of the matter by bringing their own action during the waiting
period and relegating private enforcers to intervention in the government's
suit. The existing 60-day notice requirement to the EPA has caused some
criticism because it has been argued that 60 days is simply not enough time
for the government to bring suit. 2 The proposed provision could address
this concern by extending the waiting period to ninety days.
3. Effect of Gwaltney
Giving a ninety-day notice to the alleged violator would rarely make the
case moot or cause any Gwaltney concerns'29 because it is unlikely that
violators of mitigation requirements will be able to create a wetland in ninety
days. Regardless, the proposed provision could anticipate these problems by
expressly stating that private parties can sue for past violations of required
mitigation projects.
4. Standing Concerns
Given the recent Supreme Court decision of Lujan, which Justice
Blackmun characterized as a "slash-and-burn expedition through the law of
environmental standing,"'3 the proposed citizen suit provision should also
anticipate standing problems. 3' Lujan's likely impact for typical plaintiffs
who would take advantage of the proposed enforcement provision is unclear.
The plaintiffs using the proposed provision will typically have connections to
wetlands similar to those that the plaintiffs in Lujan had to endangered animals. Canoeists, birdwatchers, and students of nature will be the likely plaintiffs asserting injuries to aesthetic, recreational, and educational interests under the proposed provision. They would probably need to show, through
specific facts, that they would be directly affected by the destruction and
non-recreation of wetlands. Absent this specific factual showing, plaintiffs
would have to rely on an explicit statement by Congress establishing their
right to sue.
Although Justice Scalia archly rejected the notion that Congress had the
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128.
129.
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131.

33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1988).
Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 72, at 898.
See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
112 S.Ct. at 2160 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
See supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 6

authority to confer standing on citizens who did not independently meet the
constitutional standing requirements embodied in Article III, he did note that
"[sitatutory broadening of the categories of injury that may be alleged in
support of standing is a different matter from abandoning the requirement
that the party seeking review must himself have suffered an injury."'32
Therefore, Congress could sidestep Lujan in the proposed provision by expressly stating that citizens who have recreational and aesthetic interests in
wetlands suffer an injury-in-fact when wetlands are destroyed and not recreated. The provision could also expressly state that a "vocational nexus,"
under which professionals interested in studying wetlands vegetation would
have the requisite injury-in-fact from their destruction and non recreation, is
sufficient to establish standing.
Despite Scalia's hostility to novel standing theories, injuries to aesthetic,
recreational, and educational interests have been accepted in the past as sufficient to establish standing.'33 Furthermore, Scalia's separation of powers
concerns may be unfounded. Private enforcement could in fact serve to correct a separation of powers deficiency by overriding bureaucratic defiance in
the executive branch and carrying out the will of the political branches as authoritatively expressed in legislation."
It should also be noted that Justice Scalia has yet to recruit a stable majority of the Court to his hostile views regarding standing. Justices Kennedy
and Souter felt compelled to note in a separate concurrence that "[as] government programs and policies become more complex and far-reaching, we
must be sensitive to the articulation of new rights of actions that do not have
clear analogs in our common-law tradition."'35 Justice Stevens also concurred in the judgment, but he did so because he believed the plaintiffs lost
on the merits, not because he believed they lacked standing.'36 Furthermore,
in a dissent which Justice O'Connor joined, Justice Blackmun noted that the
Court owed substantial deference to congressional findings of a relationship
between substantive rights and procedural remedies and that, except in unusual cases, such findings should be sufficient to confer standing on citizens
seeking to enforce the law. 3 ' Therefore, if Congress can be explicit about
how lack of enforcement of mitigation requirements harms a citizen's interests so that the citizen suffers an injury-in-fact, courts may not flatly reject

132. 112 S. Ct. at 2145-46 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972)).
133. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972) (injury to aesthetic interests); United
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 686-87 (1973) (injury to recreational interests); Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230-31,
n.4 (1986) (injury to educational interests).
134. Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 72, at 946.
135. 112 S. Ct. at 2146 (Kennedy & Souter, JJ., concurring).
136. Id. at 2147 (Stevens, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 2159 (Blackmun & O'Connor, JJ., dissenting).
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the fact that citizens have standing.
For its part, Congress has shown an increased readiness to extend citizen
suits to new applications. Despite the controversial enactment'38 of the citizen suit provision of the Clean Air Act of 1970, citizen suit provisions are
now an almost automatic part of new environmental laws. 39 Today, virtually every major environmental law contains a citizen suit provision, and Congress has shown no inclination to weaken or eliminate their use."4
5. Enforcement of Nondiscretionary Duties
Even if standing is established, private citizens cannot enforce the EPA's
discretionary duties under the CWA citizen suit provision. 4 ' Although
courts are split as to whether the CWA imposes a mandatory duty to enforce
on the EPA, the majority view seems to be that this duty is discretionary.' 42
Therefore, if a court finds that the EPA's duty to enforce mitigation requirements is discretionary, and because a nondiscretionary duty is a prerequisite to a citizens' suit, it follows that the duty to enforce would not be a
proper predicate for a citizen suit. Also, enabling private citizens to enforce
duties that are discretionary with the EPA is likely to cause tension and interference between the private and the public enforcers.
The proposed provision could expressly state that enforcing mitigation
requirements is a mandatory duty of the EPA. Therefore, the EPA's failure to
enforce would be a proper predicate for a citizen suit. However, making
enforcement a mandatory duty puts the EPA in a difficult position to the
extent that it lacks adequate enforcement resources. Furthermore, the notion
that enforcement is discretionary is fairly deeply embedded in our laws. In
Heckler v. Chaney,' the Supreme Court noted the "general unsuitability
for judicial review of agency decisions to refuse enforcement."'" Therefore,
how to ensure that citizens are able to sue for enforcement of mitigation
requirements through the proposed provision is an open question that remains
to be tackled.

138. Breen, supra note 70, at 874.
139. Id.
140. Comment, supra note 84, at 181.
141. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) (1988).
142. Note, National Wildlife Federation v. Hanson: Content-Based Review of Corps Wetlands Determinations Under the Citizens' Suit Provision of the Clean Water Act, 67 N.C. L. REV. 695, 703-04 (1989).
143. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
144. Id. at 831. The Court noted that the reasons for this unsuitability include that often an agency's
decision not to enforce involves a complicated balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly
within its expertise. Thus, the agency needs to assess whether a violation has occurred, whether agency
resources are best spent on this violation or another, whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts,
whether the particular enforcement action requested best fits the agency's overall policies, and whether the
agency has enough resources to undertake the action at all.
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6. Remedies
The remedies that the proposed citizen suit should provide should be
similar to the ones provided for in the CWA. The court should be empowered to enforce the required mitigation violations, require the defendant to
pay civil penalties, and to award the plaintiff attorney fees and litigation

costs.
If a case brought under a citizen suit provision is settled, the parties
sometimes agree to allow the defendant to make payments for an environmentally beneficial project. Courts have affirmed these settlement agreements
when they are fair, reasonable, equitable, and not in violation of the law or
public policy. 4 ' However, when a case is litigated to its conclusion, a court
ordinarily orders that civil penalties for CWA violations be deposited in the
United States Treasury.'4
Allowing private citizen groups to collect penalties from violators when a
case is litigated to its conclusion would make the proposed provision selfsupporting. This would allow and encourage citizen groups to continue bringing enforcement actions. It is unlikely that penalties deposited in the United
States Treasury will directly improve the environment. 47 Also, environmental project funds would be attractive to violators because they would give
14
them an opportunity to garner good publicity.
Allowing citizen groups to collect penalties from violators would require
a special provision. However, because this provision would radically change
the status quo, it is likely to be heavily attacked by the EPA, the federal
government, and the regulated industry. It is unclear why violators of a specific mitigation project should fund the activities of environmental
groups. 49 Even if they were obligated, it is questionable whether the overcrowded federal court system should act as the collection device. 5 Also,
concerns that overzealous attorneys would bring actions to collect monies
without any intention to use them to improve the environment should be

145. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Electronic Controls Design, Inc., 909 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1990) (court
affirmed consent decree between parties because it furthered purpose of CWA and did not violate law or
public policy; court also found defendant had not admitted liability under CWA, therefore payment did
not constitute "penalty" and was not required to be paid into U.S. Treasury). See also Citizens for a Better
Env't v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1219 (1984). But see Friends of
the Earth v. Midland, 780 F. Supp. 95 (court refused to affirm consent decree reasoning that once CWA
violation found, the court was obligated to assess penalties).
146. See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 49, 53 ("[i]f the citizen prevails in such an action, the court may order
injunctive relief and/or impose civil penalties payable to the United States Treasury"); Middlesex County
Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n. 453 U.S. 1, 14 n.25 ("Under the [Federal Water Pollution Control Act], civil penalties, payable to the Government, also may be ordered by the court.").
147. Gelpe & Barnes, supra note 81, at 1029.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1037.
150. Id.
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considered. Perhaps a more acceptable change would be to allow for penalties to be paid directly to the EPA. Increased funding to the EPA would
allow the agency to increase its staff and their qualifications, which would
likely result in better enforcement and monitoring of mitigation requirements.'
7. Gaps in Proposed Provision
The proposed citizen suit provision would be of little use if the permit
conditions that it sought to enforce were discretionary and vague. The adequacy, thoroughness, and clarity of the permit conditions determine how well
the permitted work is done and the agency's ability to enforce compliance."3 2 Therefore, permits issued along with mitigation requirements
should clearly state the applicant's responsibilities while constructing the
project. Permits should also clearly state that the applicant is responsible for
long-term mitigation success.'
Developers would likely oppose the proposed provision because it would
impose upon them the burden of success indefinitely into the future. However, as a matter of policy, the only justifiable rule is one that requires the
permittee to ensure the success of the mitigation project. Faced with stricter
mitigation requirements that are actually enforced, perhaps applicants for
dredge and fill permits will be forced to sequence and will choose avoiding
the destruction of wetlands and minimizing the impact on wetlands instead of
compensating through mitigation.
Furthermore, because it is important that artificially created wetlands
enjoy all the legal protections of natural wetlands, permit conditions should
ensure for the permanent preservation of created wetlands. Finally, mitigation
projects should require regular submittal of monitoring reports to the EPA to
facilitate identification of violators. Although requiring submittal of regular
reports would add a significant obligation to permittees, this obligation
should be treated as an additional cost of created wetlands. Both public and
private enforcement would be substantially more difficult without access to
self-monitoring reports.
In addition, to facilitate the identification of violators, the monitoring
reports could require an admission of a violation of permit requirements
when such is the case. Because created wetlands projects involve complex
scientific and technical issues, the presence or absence of a number of concrete factors that help to ensure the success of a created wetland 54 should
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This paper does not attempt to tackle all the relevant issues regarding penalties for violations;
analysis remains to be done in this area.
DER STUDY, supra note 43, at 14.
Id. executive summary.
For example, compliance with required elevation, required soils, required configuration, and re-
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be explicitly included in the monitoring report. If self-monitoring reports
make it fairly easy to identify violators, environmental groups, as well as the
EPA, will spend less time and money consulting technical experts to prove
violations.
V. CONCLUSION

The ecosystem cannot afford to continue losing wetlands at the alarming
rate at which they are being destroyed. Mitigation requiring artificially created wetlands may help offset the loss of natural wetlands. However, all mitigation entails some risk, and created wetlands are no exception. There is
much scientific and technical uncertainty surrounding wetland creation. Furthermore, high rates of noncompliance with permit conditions coupled with a
lack of systematic enforcement and monitoring makes the success of these
projects even more unlikely.
Citizen suits have prodded government agencies to enforcement and have
been the enforcement tool when the responsible agencies were unable to
enforce on their own. Most citizen suits have concentrated on the CWA
because that statute requires monitoring and self-reporting, making it relatively easy to identify violations.
Enacting a provision empowering private citizens to commence an action
against an agency which failed to enforce required mitigation, as well as
against a person who is not complying with required mitigation, is an attractive alternative. Citizen suits are likely to improve enforcement of mitigation
project requirements and thus increase the chances that created wetlands will
succeed. Although a citizen suit provision is a limited solution, there seems
to be no workable alternative at present. We have nothing to lose and much
to gain.

quired plantings would increase the chances of success of a created wetland. See id. at 5-7.

